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The lasting economic benefits from a coherent package of policy
changes would overcome the obstacles posed by short-term 
political considerations. 
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MONETARY POLICYThe Bank of Canada’s inflation-targeting framework, since its inception in 1991, has proven itself
a success. Yet further improvements in the system should be considered seriously for inclusion in
a renewed monetary policy agreement, between the Bank of Canada and the federal government,
and renewal is due in 2011. 
Some improvements would deliver genuine economic benefits to millions of Canadians over the
years ahead. Lowering the target rate for consumer price inflation in particular would help secure
the domestic purchasing power of our financial assets. Such a change, however, should be part of
a coherent framework, which addresses financial stability goals and political imperatives.
This Commentary proposes the following five-part policy package:
￿ The federal government should devote the necessary financial resources to Statistics Canada so that it
can eliminate the most significant biases in the CPI over the course of the next few years.
￿ The Bank of Canada’s formal inflation target should be reduced to 1 percent, perhaps gradually over
the course of the new agreement.
￿ The federal government should announce its intention to indemnify the Bank of Canada against
possible financial losses brought about through changes in the value of government bonds purchased
during (possible future) episodes of quantitative easing.
￿ The new inflation-targeting agreement should mention explicitly the importance of financial
stability, and that the Bank henceforth will take financial stability into consideration when
conducting its monetary policy decisions.
￿ The federal government should direct the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Canada, the Office of
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, and other relevant parties to ensure that, among them,
they have the appropriate regulatory and oversight mechanisms in place, and responsibilities for
actions clearly assigned, so that policy henceforth might be properly informed by concerns of
financial stability.
Political arguments, or inertia, might stand in the way of adopting these policy changes, but their
potential economic gains are significant enough for the country as a whole that they should be
pursued.  The economic benefits would extend far into the future, and would apply to current as
well as future generations; in contrast, the political obstacles are one-time difficulties that would
be forgotten soon after they were surmounted.
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T
he existing inflation-targeting
agreement between the Bank
of Canada and the government
of Canada will expire this year, and a
new agreement for 2012 and beyond
will soon be needed. Both parties
must think carefully about this renewal,
and fully explore the costs and
benefits of modifying the agreement.
Solid economic arguments exist for
making changes that could generate
modest benefits to millions of
Canadians over the coming years. But
equally solid “political economy”
arguments exist for maintaining the
status quo, not the least being that
the current system has been very
successful for almost 20 years.
This Commentary has two purposes. The first is
to outline four ways that Canadian monetary
policy could be improved. These include switching
from inflation targeting to price-level targeting;
reducing the Bank of Canada’s current inflation
target; correcting the existing bias in measured
inflation; and placing greater emphasis on financial
stability. The second purpose is to outline reasons
the federal government, as represented by the
minister of finance, might see a strong case for
renewing the inflation-targeting agreement in its
current form. The point is not to advocate the
status quo; rather, it is to understand the nature of
such arguments and to recognize the obstacles for
those who advocate changing the existing regime. 
I thus confront traditional economic arguments
with broader but more nebulous ones based on
political economy. Those who would modify the
current regime on the grounds that economic
improvements are possible need to think carefully
about how to communicate these economic
benefits to a minister and government likely to see
the advantages of maintaining a system that is in
no obvious need of repair. In politics as in physics,
inertia is a powerful force.
The Commentary is organized as follows. It
begins by briefly describing Canada’s 20-year
experience with inflation targeting, with a slight
emphasis on the past few years of financial crisis
and recession. Then it describes possible
improvements for Canadian monetary policy, 
and explains the nature of the benefits and the
conditions under which they are likely to exist. 
In the the following section, the discussion turn
away from economics and focuses more on
political economy, and examines the obstacles
likely to exist for each of the proposed improvements.
Finally, the paper recommends a coherent
package of policy changes predicated on the belief
that the economic benefits from these changes
would be sufficient to justify overcoming the
obstacles posed by political economy. If the Bank
of Canada decides to recommend these or other
policy changes, it will need to convince the
minister and the government that the expected
economic gains are indeed large enough to
warrant the change in policy. This might prove to
be a difficult task. 
Canadian Inflation Targeting since 1991 
Others have provided excellent reviews of
monetary policy in Canada (see, for example,
Laidler and Robson 1994, 2004; Crow 2009b;
and Robson 2009), so a detailed treatment here is
unnecessary. But it is clear that the adoption of
inflation targeting in 1991 has been a significant
policy success. The early years witnessed a notable
evolution of policy, with focus on both
implementation and communication. Perhaps the
most visible changes that took place during this
period were the Bank of Canada’s emphasis on the
target for the overnight interest rate as its primary
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instrument, its establishing of eight fixed
announcement dates (FADs) per year regarding
interest rates policy decisions, the regular
publication of the Monetary Policy Report, and the
increase in the number of speeches by the Bank’s
governor and deputy governors. As the years
passed and the policy regime matured, it also
became increasingly clear that expectations of
inflation play a crucial role, and that a large part
of the success of monetary policy relates to how
well expectations can be influenced, not only by
what the Bank says but, more important, by how
the Bank acts. As for performance, the Bank certainly
delivered on its commitments. Between 1991 and
2007, the average rate of inflation was remarkably
close to 2 percent, though there were brief periods
when inflation strayed noticeably from the Bank’s
formal 2 percent target (Melino 2011).
If the experience of the 1991-2007 period
suggests a fully mature and well-functioning
policy regime, events since then reveal that
regime’s resilience. When the global financial
system began to show its strains in summer 2007
and these strains eventually revealed deep and
systemic problems, the Bank of Canada was able
to respond effectively by increasing the liquidity
available to financial institutions, reducing the
fears of counterparty risk, and maintaining the
flow of credit. 
By fall 2008, global financial markets were in
full crisis. Even though the epicentre of the crisis
was not in Canada, the globalization of financial
markets assured that Canada would experience
significant tremors. Well-anchored inflation
expectations, together with the Bank of Canada’s
long-established credibility in returning inflation
to target, permitted the Bank to respond aggressively
by sharply cutting its target for the overnight
interest rate. By spring 2009, with its policy rate
at its effective lower bound, the Bank was on the
verge of implementing quantitative easing and
perhaps even credit easing. The US Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England had already
taken these steps, but the economic situation in
Canada was then less dire. Though the Bank
explained the potential need for these policies in
its April 2009 Monetary Policy Report, they were
never implemented. Instead, the Bank tried
something less dramatic but no less innovative: it
issued a commitment to hold its policy rate at its
effective lower bound until summer 2010,
conditional on the outlook for inflation. The
payoff appeared almost immediately in the form
of a reduction in long-term interest rates (He 2010). 
The economic events of the past few years have
brought to the fore the issue of “financial stability.”
The nature of the financial crisis – including low
capital levels, highly leveraged financial
institutions, the questionable transparency of
some financial transactions and instruments, the
collapse of storied institutions, and huge
government clean-up policies – has led to the
widespread recognition of the need for better
“macro-prudential” behaviour by financial
institutions. The conventional view holds that
existing “micro-prudential” regulations are mostly
acceptable. In contrast, an important lesson from
the financial crisis is that we need to place much
more emphasis on the interconnected nature of
financial institutions within an overall financial
system. The goal is to design regulations that
encourage behaviour less likely to lead to the
collapse of individual institutions, and especially
less likely to lead to systemic problems in the face
of the occasional individual collapses that are
inevitable in a dynamic market economy. 
Within the G20 countries, there is much debate
about the nature of macro-prudential regulation,
including which regulations should be changed
and how. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision is hard at this task, and recently came
out with some recommendations on capital
adequacy and liquidity standards (TD Economics
2010). The G20 countries endorsed these
recommendations at the Seoul Summit, and will
implement agreed-upon changes gradually over
the coming decade. Beyond the specific regulatory
changes, there is also a legitimate debate about
which governmental institutions are best
positioned to provide the necessary oversight of
the financial system (Masson and Pattison 2009).
The precise role that central banks will or should
play in providing this greater oversight is not yet
clear. I return to this important issue later in 
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Looking back on the period since 1991, and
especially the past few years, it is difficult not to
be impressed with Canadian monetary policy and
the people charged with making it work. For almost
20 years, in the face of shocks from various sources,
the Bank of Canada has upheld its commitment
to keep inflation low and stable. Even the dramatic
events of the past few years have not revealed the
Bank to be lacking in any substantive way, either
with an insufficient ability to analyze and respond
to unfolding events or with insufficient command
over institutional arrangements to make its policy
actions effective. Some important issues regarding
macro-prudential regulation are yet to be settled,
but this in no way lessens the Bank’s tremendous
policy success since 1991.
Improving Canada’s Inflation-
Targeting Regime 
Despite this success, we should not be blind to the
possibility of further improvement; but we also
need to admit that policy changes should not be
undertaken lightly. As Bank of Canada Deputy
Governor John Murray has written, the present
system “has shown its worth in both turbulent
and tranquil times. This represents a relatively
high bar against which any future changes must be
judged” (2010). 
In what follows, it is useful to distinguish
between “objective” changes and “implementation”
changes. The former involves changes to the
Bank’s formal, written objective – specifically, to
its precise policy target; the latter involves changes
in the way the Bank behaves in order to achieve its
policy target. I focus here only on potential
changes to the Bank’s objective, as I assume that
the details of implementation would be left to the
Bank to determine. 
Consider four potential improvements to
Canadian monetary policy. First, the policy target
might be adjusted in a way that better preserves
the long-run value of money – which means
reducing the long-run increase in the price level.
This goal could be pursued by adopting price-level
targeting or by reducing the inflation target.
Either option could achieve the goal as long as the
target path for the price level was chosen to rise
more slowly than the current rate of 2 percent.
The important differences between these two
options relate to stabilization and communication,
which I examine below. 
A second general improvement to monetary
policy would be to enhance its output-stabilizing
properties. Given the existing literature
(thoroughly reviewed by Ambler 2009), this goal
might be achieved by the adoption of price-level
targeting – “might” because the benefits of greater
stabilization rely on the satisfying of some
important conditions.
Monetary policy could also be improved by
removing the existing bias in the construction of
the consumer price index (CPI). While such a
correction would not imply much of a change for
the basic implementation of monetary policy, the
result would be a greater alignment between the
Bank’s formal target and the growth path of the
genuine cost of living. However, correcting the
bias in the CPI would have important
implications for the agreed-upon inflation target.
Finally, monetary policy could be improved by
ensuring that the Bank increases its focus on
financial stability. There are three general options.
First, the Bank could establish formal targets for
selected financial variables, such as asset prices or
stocks of money or flows of credit. Second, the
Bank’s formal role in the regulation and oversight
of financial institutions could be increased. Third,
the Bank could become more aggressive in
adjusting its key policy instrument to offset
evolving financial excesses. This last issue, which
White (2009) describes as the choice between
“leaning” and “cleaning,” is of tremendous
importance – but it is really more about the
implementation of monetary policy than about
the Bank’s formal objective. 
Given these four general improvements in
monetary policy, and the various specific policy
adjustments that could deliver them, my
comments in this section are divided into four
areas: adopting price-level targeting, reducing the
inflation target, removing the bias in the CPI, and
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Adopting Price-Level Targeting 
An undisputed benefit of price-level targeting (as
compared to inflation targeting) is that it reduces
uncertainty about the long-run price level and
thus reduces uncertainty about the long-run value
of money. The key distinguishing feature of price-
level targeting is that shocks pushing the price
level off its intended growth path must be
recouped, meaning that a temporary rise in
inflation above 2 percent must at some point be
offset by future inflation of less than 2 percent.
1 In
contrast, with inflation targeting, the same
positive inflation shock is subsequently reversed,
but not recouped: for the price level, bygones are
bygones. As a result, the long-run variability of the
price level is higher in a world of inflation
targeting than in a world of price-level targeting.
This greater long-run certainty in the price level
would be of no great benefit for those lucky
people whose incomes are completely indexed to
inflation. But most of us live in a world with
incomplete indexation and with institutional
arrangements where changes in nominal values
have real effects. And with the aging of the baby-
boom generation, the fraction of the population
living with incomplete indexation is likely to rise.
The long-run preservation of the value of money
thus will become increasingly important to
Canadians over the next few decades. 
A consensus is also emerging that price-level
targeting might be superior to inflation targeting
for the stabilization of output. The traditional
view of price-level targeting was that the need to
recoup inflation shocks by sharply pulling the
price level back to its target path inevitably would
lead to greater volatility in real output. A more
modern view – starting with Svensson (1999) and
Dittmar and Gavin (2000) – emphasizes the
importance of forward-looking expectations and
how these imply that price-level targeting actually
can enhance output stability. The intuition is
straightforward. Following a positive demand
shock that pushes inflation above 2 percent,
agents know that the central bank will be obliged
to reduce inflation to below 2 percent at some
point in the near future. As a result, inflation
expectations will actually fall in the face of the
positive inflation shock. For any given nominal
interest rate, the reduction in inflation
expectations raises the real interest rate and thus
enhances the tightening by the central bank. Real
gross domestic output  is thus more stable than in
the world of inflation targeting.
This striking result relies on two key assumptions.
First, consumers, workers, and firms need to
understand the difference between the price level
and the rate of inflation. Yet any truly economically
literate person who reads the press or listens to the
nightly news knows that these two concepts are
often confused, and far too often by people who
really should know the difference. The second key
assumption is that inflation expectations are
forward looking. In general terms this seems quite
tenable, but in this particular case it means that
people need to understand fully the “recouping”
aspect of price-level targeting – that inflation
above 2 percent today must imply inflation below
2 percent at some future point. This might seem a
little bizarre to people who have become
comfortable with the idea that the Bank of
Canada always tries to return the rate of inflation
to its unchanging 2 percent target. The challenge
of explaining a regime of price-level targeting
should not be overlooked. 
If price-level targeting is not fully understood
by the private sector, the short-run gains of greater
stabilization are likely to disappear. Recent
research by Kryvstov, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt
(2008) suggests that, if private expectations do not
match reality when the central bank switches from
inflation targeting to price-level targeting, the
stability-enhancing properties of the regime are
reduced and some transitional costs are created.
The same research suggests that these transitional
costs might never be offset fully by the long-run
benefits (Parkin 2009).
1 This recouping of shocks would be symmetric, so that a temporary fall in inflation to below 2 percent would need to be followed in the near
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Reducing the Inflation Target 
The principal benefit of reducing the inflation
target is the better long-run preservation of the
value of money.
2 This policy option has two
compelling advantages over trying to achieve the
same objective by adopting price-level targeting.
First, it represents a simple adjustment to a well-
understood policy regime, and given the Bank of
Canada’s long-established credibility for doing
what it claims it will do, it is likely that inflation
expectations would adjust quickly. 
The second advantage relates this credibility to
the sacrifice ratio: the cumulative loss in output
(relative to potential) per point of policy-induced
disinflation. Conventional thinking is that the
lower the central bank’s credibility, the more
slowly expectations adjust to the new policy and
thus the larger is the sacrifice ratio (Ball 1994).
But after almost 20 years of successful inflation
targeting, credibility is one thing the Bank surely
has in spades. If inflation expectations do adjust
quickly to an announced reduction in inflation,
there is good reason to expect the transitional
costs in terms of output and employment to be
very small.
3
That a reduction in the inflation target might
dominate the adoption of price-level targeting (for
the equivalent growth path of the price level) does
not necessarily mean that a reduction in the
inflation target dominates the status quo.
Traditionally, there have been two concerns about
very low rates of inflation, and a formal inflation
target below 2 percent is very low by all practical
standards, across time or across countries (Roger
2009). First – as argued many years ago by Tobin
(1972) and more recently by Akerlof, Dickens,
and Perry (1996) and Fortin (1996) – the
presence of downward nominal-wage rigidity
might imply that a very low rate of inflation
increases unemployment permanently because
some necessary sectoral adjustments in real wages
become infeasible. Second, as is now commonly
discussed, very low inflation might significantly
constrain the conduct of monetary policy because
of the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates. 
Both concerns have diminished in recent years.
There is some evidence that nominal wages are
not as rigid as was once thought and also that the
employment implications are not as significant as
once believed (see Crawford and Hogan 1998;
Farès and Hogan 2000). Perhaps this is due to our
increased experience in a low-inflation environment
and thus greater willingness on the part of workers
to accept cuts in nominal wages in the face of
large negative shocks. The modest decline in
union membership evident since the 1980s also
might play a role. In addition, the existence of
labour-market turnover permits new employees to
be hired at lower wages than existing employees,
meaning that aggregate nominal wages might be
more flexible than any individual worker’s wage.
Regarding employment, perhaps the real wage
plays a less allocative role than we are used to
thinking and, therefore, whatever nominal-wage
rigidity does exist has few implications for
employment and unemployment.
As for the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates, the past few years have been extremely
informative. For those economists previously
unable to imagine how a central bank could take
expansionary actions once its policy rate was at (or
near) zero, it is now clear from the US and UK
experiences that quantitative easing is a viable tool
for injecting reserves into the financial system and
possibly for reducing long-term interest rates. And
from the Canadian experience, we know that a
conditional commitment to keep policy rates low
is a tool that can be added to the central bank’s
arsenal (He 2010). It must be admitted, though,
that we do not yet know enough about the full
success of these policies. In the case of quantitative
2 The possible growth benefits associated with further reductions in the inflation rate are ignored here. I have argued elsewhere (Ragan 1998)
that there is no compelling reason for believing that reducing the annual inflation rate from 2 percent to 1 percent would have any effect on
the growth rate, though it may generate other hard-to-measure benefits.
3 Given the prevalence of long-term bonds (both private and public), a relatively quick one percentage point reduction in the rate of inflation
would generate windfall redistributions between debtors and creditors. If avoiding such windfall gains and losses was viewed as important,
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easing, it is possible that aggregate demand will
not respond as intended to the increase in
reserves; we may also end up learning a great deal
about the nature of the monetary transmission
mechanism, especially if inflationary pressures
start to build well before the relevant output gaps
are closed. Nonetheless, there is now growing
evidence that central banks with policy rates at the
zero lower bound are far from helpless.
The argument that monetary policy is not
helpless when policy rates are near zero is not the
same as arguing that we should feel comfortable
about intentionally putting the Bank of Canada in
a situation where it must use “unconventional”
policy, especially quantitative easing. When I was
at Finance Canada in 2009-10, I noted that many
officials were quite content that the Bank never
found it necessary to go this far. It still puzzles me
that many people seem to think quantitative
easing is entirely new, and do not seem to remember
that, behind the scenes of the Bank’s “conventional”
interest-rate decisions, money and bonds are
changing hands (with a lag) in a way that we now
describe as “unconventional.” Be that as it may,
the thought of the Bank’s engaging in quantitative
easing (and especially credit easing) made some
people very uncomfortable. 
Some legitimate concerns exist with
quantitative easing. First, it is difficult to know
how many bonds to purchase in order to generate
the intended effects on longer-term interest rates.
This fundamental ignorance about the position
and interest elasticity of money demand is, of
course, one of the main reasons central banks
eventually came to adopt the targeting of short-
term interest rates rather than monetary quantities.
Though this is an important operational detail, it
is not a fundamental reason quantitative easing
should not be pursued when expansionary policy
is needed. Second, there is a concern that the
central bank might not get the timing right on the
exit – although this exit challenge is similar to any
exit for monetary policy, balancing the need to
support a growing economy with the need to
avoid inflationary pressures. 
Finally, quantitative easing raises an interesting
question of accounting. When the Bank of
Canada purchases government bonds in the
ordinary course of providing cash to a growing
financial system, these bonds are assumed to be
held to maturity and are valued at their historical
cost. But any bonds purchased with the intent of
reselling them in the near future – as would be the
case for quantitative easing over a period of a few
years – are valued at their current market value. As
a result, as economic recovery takes hold and
interest rates eventually rise, these newly purchased
bonds would decline in value and the Bank would
experience a capital loss. If the volume of these
newly purchased bonds and the decline in their
value were large, the Bank could report an overall
financial loss. In an extreme case, the losses could
cause the Bank to become technically insolvent.
To avoid this possibility, the government could
indemnify the Bank of all losses. Of course, since
the government of Canada has a consolidated
balance sheet, which includes all of the Crown
corporations, including the Bank of Canada, this
indemnification would amount in financial reality
to no more than shifting accounting entries from
one place to another on the same balance sheet.
4
But there is an important issue of financial
perception: how would the government or the
minister of finance like the possibility of the
Bank’s either losing money or becoming insolvent
and needing a government “bail out”?
Removing the Existing Bias in the CPI 
Recent evidence suggests that Canada’s rate of CPI
inflation is biased upward by about 0.6 percent
(Rossiter 2005), so when inflation is measured to
be 2.0 percent, true inflation is only 1.4 percent.
The two primary causes of this bias are the failure
to account quickly for the creation of new
products and the disappearance of old ones, and
4 An insolvent Bank of Canada could still conduct monetary policy, as long as it still possessed the ability to create money and it still owned
assets (government bonds) that it could sell into the open market in order to reduce the money supply.Commentary 321 | 7
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the failure to account for consumers’ substitution
away from products with faster-rising prices and
toward products with slower-rising or even falling
prices (Smith 2009). Two motivations for
correcting this bias are mundane but nonetheless
fundamental in a modern economy; the third is of
direct interest to fiscal policy.
First, the corrected CPI inflation rate would
provide a better indicator of changes in the true
cost of living, and thus monetary policy would be
targeting a variable more meaningful to Canadian
firms and households. Second, to the extent that
the existing bias has a cyclical component, the
more accurate measure of true inflation would
better reflect demand or supply pressures that lead
to changes in inflation, and thus would be a better
guide for monetary policy decisions. More
generally, for the many nominal values in the
economy that are geared to movements in the
CPI, from wages and rents to child-support
payments and pensions, correcting the
measurement of the CPI would be akin to
recalibrating an engine to improve performance. 
The fiscal implications of correcting the CPI
bias are likely to catch the attention of the
minister of finance. The income-tax system is
indexed to measured inflation; similarly, many
government expenditures, such as elderly benefits,
children’s benefits, and interest payments on real-
return bonds, are indexed to measured inflation. 
If measured inflation is above true inflation,
expenditures are higher and tax revenues are lower
than would be the case with more accurate
measurement. It follows that correcting the CPI
bias would unambiguously improve the federal
government’s fiscal position, although a precise
estimate of the size of the improvement would
require detailed tax and expenditure information
only the federal government possesses. Simple
back-of-the-envelope calculations, however,
suggest that the fiscal gains would be hundreds of
millions of dollars per year.
5 In contrast, the cost
of making the CPI corrections likely would be
only a small fraction of this amount.
If the government devoted the necessary
resources to eliminating the CPI bias, there would
be important implications for monetary policy.
Correcting the bias would close the gap between
true and measured inflation, but it would matter
how this gap was closed: through a reduction in
the measured value or through an increase in the
true value. Consider three policy options. 
In Option 1, the bias would be corrected but the
formal inflation target would be left unchanged.
As the bias was removed and the Bank of Canada
kept measured inflation at its target value, the true
inflation rate would rise from 1.4 percent to 2.0
percent. In the absence of a clear announcement,
such an increase in inflation by stealth surely
should be avoided. Note also that the government
would receive no fiscal benefits in this case because
there would be no change in measured inflation.
Since this option would generate few benefits and
introduce new costs through higher inflation,
there are solid reasons to avoid it. Yet, I have been
told by some in Ottawa that this scenario is too
extreme, and that the change in true inflation
would not occur suddenly. The process of
correcting the bias in the CPI apparently would
take several years to accomplish, so instead of an
immediate upward jump in the true inflation rate,
there would be a gradual upward creep in true
inflation as the existing CPI bias was gradually
reduced. Even if true, as seems likely, this claim
does not solve the underlying problem that this
policy option, by increasing inflation, would impose
costs on millions of Canadians over many years.
That it would occur gradually by stealth, and thus
without public discussion or acknowledgement, is
hardly an argument in its favour.
5 Consider the payment of Old Age Security, an expenditure of roughly $35 billion annually. This sum is increasing at an annual rate of
approximately 4 percent, half due to the growing number of recipients and half due to the indexation of the payments. If measured inflation
fell by 0.6 percent, the growth of these payments would fall commensurately, by roughly $210 million annually. The total annual fiscal
impact of correcting the CPI bias, including the effect on other indexed expenditures and tax revenues, therefore, would be considerably
larger than this amount.| 8 Commentary 321
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Option 2 would be to correct the CPI bias and
to reduce the inflation target to 1.4 percent. In
this case, true inflation would remain unchanged
at 1.4 percent, but measured inflation would fall
from 2.0 percent to 1.4 percent. Here, there
would be no costs associated with the possibility
that inflation was now too low, since the true rate
of inflation would be unchanged. We would get
all the benefits associated with measured inflation’s
now being a better indication of cyclical pressures
and of changes in the real cost of living. In
addition, the government would receive the full
fiscal benefits of eliminating the overindexation of
taxation and expenditures. The only downside
with this option is that the formal inflation target
would become an unusual number: 1.4 percent. 
The emphasis on eliminating a bias of 0.6
percent and thus a reduction of the inflation
target by this same amount suggests, however, a
level of precision greater than we actually possess.
After all, the estimated bias of 0.6 percent is just
that – an estimate – and as such it should be
viewed with some caution. In addition, it is an
estimate based on an average across time (Rossiter
2005). At any moment, it is likely that the bias is
either higher or lower than this average amount.
Furthermore, the process of correcting the CPI
bias would unlikely eliminate fully the existing
bias for the simple reason that it would be
prohibitively expensive to do so; instead, realistic
and cost-effective corrections to the data-collection
process would eliminate only the most important
sources of the bias. The upshot is that we should
not be too literal in presenting this second policy
option as reducing the inflation target to exactly
1.4 percent – a numerical target that would
indeed be odd. But even if we recognized that the
CPI correction would be only approximately 0.6
percent and thus modified this option so that the
inflation target was reduced to 1.5 percent, we
would still be left with a formal inflation target
that probably would fail a sensible “focal point”
test. For the purposes of communicating with the
public and focusing inflation expectations, there is
genuine value in using round numbers for the
inflation target. 
Option 3 would be to correct the CPI bias and
reduce the inflation target to 1.0 percent. In this
case, true inflation would fall modestly, from 1.4
percent to 1.0 percent, even though measured
inflation would fall by one full percentage point.
A compelling case can be made for this option, for
several reasons. First, the reduction in true
inflation would generate long-run benefits to
Canadians through the better preservation of the
value of money. Second, measured inflation now
would reflect more accurately cyclical pressures
and genuine changes in the cost of living. Third,
the communication of the new inflation target
would be simple; a 1 percent target clearly would
be as easy to explain and to communicate, and
would represent as good a “focal point” as the
current 2 percent target. Fourth, the government
would receive the full fiscal benefits from
removing the overindexation of the tax and
expenditure system. The only potential downside
of this policy option is that true inflation then
might be “too low.” However, given the weak
evidence of problems associated with nominal
wage rigidity, recent US and UK experience with
quantitative easing, and the fact that true inflation
would fall by less than one percentage point, any
problems on this front likely would be quite
small. The correction of the CPI bias together
with a reduction in the inflation target to 1
percent would constitute a coherent and desirable
policy package. 
Enhancing Financial Stability 
Discussing financial stability is difficult for many
traditional macroeconomists (like me) whose
formative training typically assumed away most of
what we now know to be the interesting features
of financial markets. Laidler (2010) and Laidler
and Banerjee (2008) have explained the extent to
which we collectively missed the boat and also
some of what we will need to do to get back on
board. A better understanding of financial
markets, and a better integration of these markets
into aggregate macro models, must be on the
research agenda for the profession.Commentary 321 | 9
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Yet one can better understand financial markets
and still have difficulty knowing what is meant by
financial stability. The term is used in different
ways by different people, making it difficult to
have a constructive conversation about the issues.
For some people, financial stability means that
firms and households are less prone to developing
financial excesses. For others, the emphasis is on
asset-price “bubbles” – the tendency to have long
bull markets followed by sudden crashes. Some
emphasize the need to prevent the collapse of
individual financial institutions of any size, while
others think that individual collapses are inevitable
but that the key issue is about ensuring systemic
stability in the face of such collapses (Freedman
and Goodlet 2007). Finally, many are concerned
about the “too big to fail” problem, and how the
embedded moral hazard leads inevitably to further
financial excesses (Goodlet 2010). 
My understanding of the 2007-08 financial
crisis and the subsequent recession is that many
complex and interrelated factors came together to
produce the problems that emerged (Ragan
2010). But if pushed to identify the fundamental
problem, I would single out inappropriate
regulation of many kinds. It follows that the
fundamental fix is one of designing better
regulations and better mechanisms for regulatory
oversight. Various regulations need to be reviewed,
including those related to bank leverage and
capital, in terms of both the appropriate level and
cyclicality. The valuation of assets and liabilities is
also an issue, as is the appropriate provisioning for
losses. The transparency of specific financial
instruments and the markets in which they are
transacted also deserve attention. And regulations
dealing with the form of mortgages, mortgage-
lending practices, and mortgage insurance also
need to be reviewed (Masson and Pattison 2009). 
These kinds of regulatory changes are currently
being examined by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, and when implemented
they will have two general implications for
monetary policy. First, by making the behaviour
of financial institutions more “macro-prudential,”
the overall financial system presumably will
become more resilient to various kinds of
financial-market shocks, including the collapse of
individual institutions. If so, there will be less
need for central banks to intervene in those
markets with extraordinary measures such as those
taken in 2007 and 2008. Second, changes in
specific regulations, especially those dealing with
the level and cyclicality of bank capital, are likely
to alter the nature of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism – perhaps in unexpected
ways. Central banks thus need to do more
research, especially on how the precise regulatory
arrangements will affect institutional behaviour
over the business cycle and thus how central banks
will need to alter their decision rules. 
Both sets of changes are of obvious importance
to central banks, so one should never argue that
regulatory solutions designed to enhance financial
stability are unrelated to monetary policy.
However, neither change has an obvious
implication for whether or how a central bank’s
inflation objective should be altered. Perhaps
greater future knowledge of financial stability and
how it would be affected by regulatory changes
will suggest that clear improvements are available
if central banks shifted to price-level targeting or
altered their inflation objective in other specific
ways. But our current state of knowledge does not
permit such a clear policy recommendation. In
arguing that the prevention of future financial
crises is mostly about having better regulation and
oversight, I agree with Bank of Canada Governor
Mark Carney, who has stated that, 
“Experience has shown that monetary and
financial stability are more tightly bound than had
been appreciated. Price stability is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for the stabilization of
economic activity, and it must be supplemented by
a robust macro-prudential regulatory framework.
This, in turn, will have consequences for the
implementation of monetary policy. If these
macro-prudential tools prove insufficient to
achieve financial stability, monetary policy faces a
difficult trade-off between flexibility and
credibility” (2009, 8). | 10 Commentary 321
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The “if” at the beginning of the last sentence is
crucial. If the macro-prudential tools are up to the
task of delivering enhanced financial stability,
then monetary policy can remain in familiar
territory. 
Or can it? One can argue for leaving unaltered
the Bank’s inflation target while also arguing that
the Bank needs to change its behaviour in ways
more fundamental than merely researching more
fully the nature of the transmission mechanism.
While the financial crisis was caused mostly by
problems of inappropriate regulation, White
(2009) and Laidler and Banerjee (2008) argue
convincingly that an important part of the problem
was that central banks in many countries were too
unwilling to “lean” against growing financial
excesses – such as dramatic increases in financial
leverage in the household and corporate sector –
implicitly preferring to “clean up” whatever messes
were created by the eventual financial collapse.
White (2009), Parkin (2009), and others argue
sensibly that we should not think of “leaning” in
terms of the Bank’s formally targeting a set of asset
prices. Not only is it unclear which small set of
prices to target, it is also unclear how to identify
any given price increase as “inappropriate” or
somehow disconnected from the underlying
“fundamentals.” White’s concept of leaning is far
less formulaic and more subtle than formal targeting
would ever permit – in short, a central bank that
chooses to lean against financial excesses needs to
look broadly at financial markets and use its
discretion and judgment very carefully. It needs to
cast its eyes over asset prices and financial leverage
that are deviating from their longer-run trends,
and to examine the growth rates of monetary
quantities and flows of credit that appear to be
unusually large (Laidler and Bergevin 2010).
White (2009) reminds us that many financial
crises through history were preceded by the
development of financial excess, and his guiding
principle for policy is that careful but significant
pre-emptive policy tightening is more effective
than the massive and sudden monetary expansions
that typically follow financial crises. Furthermore,
both he and Laidler and Banerjee (2008) argue
that the practice of leaning against financial excess
is entirely consistent with maintaining the
credibility of a formal inflation target. 
As sensible as leaning appears to be, it would
not require a change in the central bank’s formal
inflation objective. Rather, it is an important issue
of the implementation of monetary policy. In other
words, with the possible exception of having the
new inflation-targeting agreement explicitly state
that the Bank will pay more attention to financial
stability (and presumably what that means), the
issue of “lean versus clean” is unlikely to form a
case for changing the Bank’s formal policy target.
Carney (2009) raises the possibility that the
adoption of price-level targeting might make
aggressive leaning more feasible because agents
know we eventually would return to the targeted
price-level path; this is another example of the
(possibly) better stabilizing properties of price-
level targeting discussed earlier. But we probably
do not yet know enough about leaning or 
price-level targeting or the formation of agents’
expectations to make a strong case for a policy switch. 
Political Economy and the Case for
the Status Quo 
Many economists, if they have any opinions at all
about political economy, view it as rather “soft” or
“fuzzy,” and certainly less rigorous than what they
are used to studying. It follows for many that
political economy is easy – maybe even so obvious
that it need not take up their valuable time. I do
not share this view; I find political economy
neither easy nor obvious. My limited time in
Ottawa has taught me two things in this regard.
First, mainstream economists like me are often
quite poor at predicting which issues will catch
the attention of elected officials. Our minds seem
to operate along different planes, and we are
attuned to different concerns. Second, the
political element often plays a bigger role in the
design and implementation of policy than does
the economic one. For governments across the
spectrum, political efficacy often trumps
economic sensibility. 
So, while economists might not be the best
placed to analyze the political economy aspects ofCommentary 321 | 11
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real-world policy, we should be under no illusion
that doing so is unimportant. We should admit
that it is worth thinking through the relevant
issues, in the hope that we will better understand
the decisions of elected officials. For anyone who
truly believes in democratic systems and processes,
“political” should not be considered a dirty word.
My comments here are in three parts. First, 
I briefly examine the conditions that motivate
policy changes. Second, from the perspective of
political economy, I examine the desirability of
each of the proposed changes from the previous
section. Finally, I address the important issue of
the timing of policy changes. 
Motivating Policy Changes 
What motivates significant policy changes? I focus
on two essential considerations: the importance of
garnering political support and the importance of
resolving genuine policy problems. With these
considerations in mind, one can identify three
general situations that motivate a change in policy. 
First, policies might be changed because there is
a perception that a genuine policy problem needs
to be fixed, and that the fix is so important that
political concerns are largely ignored. Past and
present governments have shown their willingness
to suffer considerable political unpopularity when
a policy problem really does need to be addressed.
An obvious recent example is the Conservatives’
decision on income trusts in fall 2006; the current
push for a Canadian securities regulator also
might fall in this category, given strong and
apparently growing opposition in Alberta,
Manitoba, and Québec.
In the second category are situations in which
policies are changed primarily for reasons of
electoral advantage, even though there is no
indication that the policy is in need of repair. In
more extreme circumstances, policies are changed
to garner public support despite the clear
possibility that the change might actually worsen
the underlying policy. The cuts in the Goods and
Services Tax in 2006 and 2007 and the more
recent elimination of the mandatory long-form
census are examples where the government was
prepared to change policies even in the face of
strong and united opposition by the policy
community. 
Finally, consider those situations in which a
genuine need to repair or improve a policy is
aligned with an electoral case for doing so. In such
cases, the policy wonks are in agreement with the
voters, though perhaps for different reasons. There
are many examples from recent years. The fiscal
stimulus contained in the 2009 and 2010 budgets
is in this category, as is the planned return to
budget balance by fiscal year 2014/15. The tariff
cuts in the 2010 budget enter here, and so does
the government’s successful arguments within the
G20 against a bank tax. 
To summarize, one of two conditions appears to
be necessary to motivate elected officials to make a
significant change in economic policy: there must
be either a genuine need to repair a broken policy
or some electoral payoff from a policy change, or
perhaps both. But a situation in which neither
condition is satisfied is likely to be one where the
ministers involved decide to spend their valuable
time and political capital on other concerns. 
Political Economy Objections 
When evaluating the political economy objections
to the policy changes proposed earlier, one must
emphasize three principles. First, as just stated,
policy changes generally require either the need to
fix a real policy problem or the belief that a policy
change will lead to political gains. Second,
effective communications are often challenging in
the political arena, especially with subtle economic
ideas. The more subtle the idea, the more effort it
takes to communicate the reasons behind the
policy change; and the more time spent
communicating, the more likely it is that a
minister will say something unintended and
possibly contentious, thus sparking debate and
perhaps worse. Difficult communications can
erode valuable political capital, which brings us to
the third principle: political capital is a scarce
resource, and elected officials seek to preserve
theirs and spend it only when it is most needed,
preferably in the pursuit of favoured projects. | 12 Commentary 321
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Consider, first, the case for switching the Bank
of Canada’s formal objective to a price-level target.
There would be a clear, long-run benefit in terms
of reducing uncertainty about the price level, but
this might not resonate with many people, elected
or not. There might be short-run benefits from
better stabilization of output, but only to the
extent that the public fully understood the
workings of the regime. Perhaps the Bank could
successfully explain the details to the public, and
the stabilization benefits of the regime therefore
would come to pass. But it is reasonable to be
skeptical that such a system would ever be as well
understood as the current system is now. Perhaps
the adoption of price-level targeting would allow
the Bank to lean against financial market excesses
while maintaining its credibility regarding its
price-level objective. Based on our current
research and knowledge, however, these gains are
hard to assess. Finally, the switch from inflation
targeting to price-level targeting is hardly a policy
designed to win votes with ordinary Canadians. In
terms of political economy, there is a forceful case
for not adopting a price-level target.
Reducing the inflation target would offer clear,
long-run gains by better preserving the value of
money, and these gains likely would rise over time
as the population ages. For some, however, the
case against this policy has strengthened in the
past two years, since it is now clear that large
shocks can drive the policy interest rate to zero
and force the Bank into contemplating
unconventional policy actions that leave some
people uncomfortable. Though the technical
communication of this policy change ought to be
straightforward, the minister of finance would
have to explain why a reduction in the inflation
target is a good idea in 2011, especially when
Canada’s current 2 percent target is as low as
inflation targets elsewhere and no other inflation-
targeting country has reduced its target recently
(Roger 2009). “Sticking with a winning model” is
unlikely to lose many votes, while making a
switch to a lower inflation target might lose votes
from those who view the policy change as imprudent.
Political economy thus offers a solid case for not
reducing Canada’s formal inflation target.
Correcting the existing bias in the CPI would
generate obvious economic benefits. The
unsurprising, though hard to measure, benefits
would flow from having a more accurate measure
of changes in the genuine cost of living and from
the better monetary policy that presumably would
result from using a more accurate measure of
inflation to gauge excess demand and supply
pressures in the economy. The benefit that would
be easier to measure is the fiscal gain that would
result from eliminating the overindexation of
current spending and taxation. Some will observe
rightly that these fiscal benefits would not accrue
to the overall economy since they really would be
just a reduction in public spending and an
increase in tax revenues; others will view it more
like the desirable closing of an existing loophole.
Whatever benefits came from correcting the
CPI measurement, however, we should not think
that making such a change is a small thing for
monetary policy. The three options detailed above
make it clear that we must either adjust the formal
inflation target when making this correction or
accept the higher inflation by stealth. But policy
changes should not be implemented if their
acceptance relies on public ignorance or
confusion. The minister and the government need
to think through the implications of adjusting the
inflation target before deciding to correct the bias
in the CPI; these two policy adjustments should
be undertaken, or not, together. 
As for electoral support, correcting the CPI bias
would present a real challenge. If government
outlays – especially elderly and children’s benefits
– have been rising too quickly because measured
inflation exceeds true inflation, then correcting
the CPI bias would reduce these payouts relative
to what would otherwise occur. The government
could sensibly claim that past payouts have been
excessive and that the correction merely would
put them back on their intended path.
6 Whatever
6 If the price index relevant to seniors (or children) systematically increases faster than the overall CPI, then one might argue that the current
system contains no such overpayments.Commentary 321 | 13
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the government’s argument, however, the truth is
that the growth of these payments in real terms
would fall as a result of a CPI correction, and the
government needs to be mindful of the likely
opposition to this policy. So correcting the CPI
bias, despite the aggregate benefits it would generate,
offers a way to lose some votes among specific
groups of Canadians, but few votes would be won
or lost by ignoring the issue and maintaining the
status quo.
Efforts to enhance financial stability are clearly
important. But of all the issues I review in this
Commentary, we know the least about financial
stability – what it means, how to improve it, and
how monetary policy can be used to enhance it.
The minister of finance or the government might
view three aspects of the issue separately: the
choice of an inflation (or price-level) objective and
how this would relate to financial stability, the
need for the Bank of Canada to have greater
regulatory or oversight powers in financial
markets, and the case for having the Bank lean
more aggressively against financial excesses in the
conduct of its regular monetary policy. 
As for the idea that pursuing a price-level target
(rather than an inflation target) is likely to
enhance financial stability, there are two
immediate objections. First, as argued earlier, one
can be skeptical of whether the public would
understand a system of price-level targeting
sufficiently to generate the predicted benefits.
Second, our collective ignorance about how price-
level targeting would contribute to financial
stability suggests delaying such a policy change
until we are able to make a more informed choice. 
Regarding the expansion of the Bank’s formal
role in the regulation or oversight of financial
markets, a powerful political economy objection
might come from those on Parliament Hill who
believe that any enhanced power should lie with
elected rather than appointed officials. In
addition, one can argue that getting the Bank
directly involved in regulatory affairs might expose
it to excessive political influence and thus threaten
its valuable operational independence. From a
technical perspective, however, two observations
make it easy to argue for an increased role for the
Bank (Crow 2009a). First, the Bank’s expertise in
macroeconomics and the macro role of financial
markets likely exists in no other Canadian
institution, so giving it some increased responsibilities
in dealing with macro-prudential regulations
seems only logical. Second, if new financial-market
regulations involved cyclical capital requirements,
it would be incumbent on someone to determine
when to pull the cyclical “trigger”; given that the
Bank controls the most important countercyclical
tool in the government’s policy arsenal, the Bank
clearly should be involved in this decision. The
Bank’s appropriate role in this domain is clearly a
complex and contentious issue, and it needs to be
examined and debated thoroughly. 
Finally, consider the case for the Bank’s
enhancing financial stability by modifying its
regular conduct of monetary policy. Even if there
were no change in its inflation objective and the
Bank played no greater role in the regulation or
oversight of financial markets, it could genuinely
embrace the idea of leaning against financial
excesses. This would require work on the part 
of the Bank, including clear and effective
communication about what it was doing and why,
but this kind of change would be about how the
Bank pursues its existing inflation objective; 
it would not require a fundamental change to 
that objective. 
More to the point for the discussion here, the
minister of finance and the government likely
would be in favour of such a change in the Bank’s
behaviour. If the inflation-targeting agreement
included an explicit statement regarding the
importance of financial stability, as well as the
need for the Bank to consider this as part of its
monetary policy, the public and financial press
would view this as an obvious and sensible
response to the events of the past few years: if
anything, any new inflation-targeting agreement
that excluded such considerations probably would
be viewed as imprudent. At the same time, the
details of how the Bank built its concern for| 14 Commentary 321
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financial stability into its monetary policy decisions
could be left for the Bank to determine, based on
its evolving expertise on such matters. 
Timing, Timing, Timing! 
If “location” is the cardinal rule in real estate, then
perhaps “timing” is the cardinal rule for politics
and policy changes. For decision makers governed
by the forces of political economy, the current
timing provides a compelling argument for
renewing the inflation-targeting agreement in its
existing form. 
In 2006, at the time of the last renewal, the
adoption of price-level targeting or a reduction in
the inflation target would have been an easier sell.
The inflation-targeting regime had been a clear
success for 15 years, and the traditional arguments
for the modest long-run benefits would have been
as compelling as they are today. The policy regime
had responded very well to various economic and
financial shocks, and most people thought it quite
unlikely that future events would ever push the
Bank of Canada’s policy rate to its effective lower
bound. The problem was that, in 2006, the Bank’s
own research on the details of alternative regimes
was incomplete, and not advanced enough to
justify a well-informed change of policy 
(Ragan 2005). 
Since then, the Bank’s research has progressed
considerably (see, for example, Amano, Carter,
and Coletti 2009), and we are better positioned
than before to make an informed judgment about
the issues that eluded us in 2006. Indeed, had the
intervening years been smooth and uneventful, we
would now be in a better position to improve the
monetary policy regime. In such a world, one
could make reasonable arguments for adopting
price-level targeting and, even better in my view,
very compelling arguments for reducing the
inflation target.
Yet the world economy has been anything but
smooth and uneventful since 2006, and new
issues have arisen. The global financial crisis and
subsequent recession led to an aggressive response
by central banks, which found their policy rates
pushed against the floor for an extended period.
The world has been introduced to quantitative
and credit easing, making some people uneasy.
And financial stability has become the multifaceted
premier issue, about which we still have much to
learn. These developments make it more difficult
to advocate changes in the Bank’s inflation
objective. They certainly argue for research,
deliberation, and debate – but perhaps not yet for
changing the Bank’s policy target.
Our elected leaders might see two additional
reasons why the timing is not right for changing
the Bank’s inflation objective. Canada’s financial
system has been held up as a model of both
effective regulation and prudent behaviour. Our
leaders boast about the quality of Canada’s system
and about the fact that the worst excesses clearly
evident in the United States or the United
Kingdom did not appear here. And the Bank has
played an important role at the heart of this
financial system: its response to the financial crisis
and recession was creative, aggressive, and, by all
indications, effective. The evident success of
Canada’s financial system, then, makes it awkward
for a minister of finance to announce that we are
soon to change the Bank’s objective. Why tinker
with success? Is there really a problem to which we
would like to draw the world’s attention? 
Current developments in the US and world
economies also matter. The fragile economic
recovery in the United States and the unfolding
debt crisis in Europe make it a politically awkward
time, for example, to reduce Canada’s inflation
target. If Canada’s recovery continues more
quickly than that of the United States, policy rates
will rise relatively quickly here. In the absence of
credible plans to consolidate fiscal positions in the
United States and Europe, inflation expectations
in those regions could begin to rise. For both
reasons, the Canadian dollar might continue its
nominal and real appreciation against the US
dollar, and there is no particular reason to think
that par would be an upper limit. Choosing this
time to reduce Canada’s inflation target below
those anywhere else in the world would merely
strengthen the forces for a nominal appreciation.
While economists might recognize that such a
nominal appreciation should be irrelevant to thereal exchange rate and other real outcomes, the
considerable and pervasive real/nominal confusion
guarantees that any appreciation of the Canadian
dollar would be a genuine and troublesome issue
of political economy. 
A Coherent Policy Package
I have discussed several changes that could
improve monetary policy in Canada. Despite the
significant success of the inflation-targeting
framework since 1991, further improvements in
the system should be considered seriously –
improvements that would deliver genuine
economic benefits to millions of Canadians over
the years ahead. I have also discussed why
considerations of political economy might stand
in the way of adopting these improvements, and I
have emphasized the appeal of maintaining the
status quo. It is always easy to be complacent
when current policies are working well, but the
cost of that complacency would be borne by
future generations. 
My assessment is that the potential economic
gains from adopting some of these policy changes
are significant enough for the country as a whole
that they should be pursued, despite the real
obstacles erected by considerations of political
economy. The economic benefits would extend far
into the future, and would apply to current as well
as future generations; in contrast, the political
obstacles are one-time difficulties that would be
forgotten soon after they were surmounted. I
therefore propose the following five-part 
policy package:
￿ The federal government should devote the
necessary financial resources to Statistics Canada
so that it can eliminate the most significant biases
in the CPI over the course of the next few years.
￿ The Bank of Canada’s formal inflation target
should be reduced to 1 percent, perhaps gradually
over the course of the new agreement.
￿ The federal government should announce its
intention to indemnify the Bank of Canada
against possible financial losses brought about
through changes in the value of government bonds
purchased during (possible future) episodes of
quantitative easing.
￿ The new inflation-targeting agreement should
mention explicitly the importance of financial
stability, and that the Bank henceforth will take
financial stability into consideration when
conducting its monetary policy decisions.
￿ The federal government should direct the Ministry
of Finance, the Bank of Canada, the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions, and
other relevant parties to ensure that, among them,
they have the appropriate regulatory and oversight
mechanisms in place, and responsibilities for
actions clearly assigned, so that policy henceforth
might be properly informed by concerns of
financial stability.
This set of policies would provide a coherent
package for both the Bank and the government.
The argument for correcting the bias in the CPI is
based partly on the gains from having a more
meaningful measure of inflation and partly on the
fiscal benefits from closing what is essentially a
bias-produced loophole in the tax and expenditure
system. In the presence of such a correction,
however, it is necessary to recognize the need to
change the formal inflation target so as to avoid an
increase in inflation by stealth. Reducing the
inflation target to 1 percent implies only a very
small reduction in the true (average) rate of
inflation – large enough to generate some genuine
benefits but small enough to avoid potential
problems from inflation’s being too low. 
Reducing the inflation target would generate
economic benefits by reducing the ongoing
erosion in the value of money, but it also would
put the Bank in a position more likely to
encounter the zero lower bound on its policy
interest rate. In recognition of the increased
likelihood of using quantitative easing at some
point in the future, the Bank should be
indemnified against possible financial losses. On
this point, it is really perceptions, rather than
genuine financial requirements, that drive the
policy recommendation, but perceptions are rarely
irrelevant. It would be better for the government
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to announce soon that it will henceforth indemnify
the Bank of Canada, well before any crisis occurs,
than to explain to a questioning public in the heat
of the moment why a loss-making central bank is
not really a big deal.
The last two parts of the package relate to the
importance of financial stability. It probably
would be reckless for the new agreement to be
silent on this crucial issue, given the experience of
the past few years, so the concept should make
some kind of explicit appearance in the inflation-
targeting agreement. That being said, one should
also recognize that our knowledge about the
connection between financial stability and
monetary policy is unclear, preventing specific
details in the agreement. The agreement should
clarify that the Bank will pay more attention to
enhancing financial stability; at the same time,
details of implementation need to be left to the
Bank to sort out over time.
For its part, the federal government needs to
give more thought to whether the current
institutional arrangements provide the macro-
prudential regulations and oversight necessary to
prevent a crisis in the face of large future financial
shocks. Perhaps the current arrangements are
satisfactory, perhaps not. But the prudent, sensible
and responsible action for the government is to
make sure that the difficult questions are being
asked, the genuine debates between various parties
are being resolved, and the necessary responsibilities
are being clearly assigned. Given the extent to
which Canadian leaders have been accepting
congratulations from around the world for having
such a sound financial system, it would be
embarrassing indeed to discover that this system
actually lacked the resilience needed to withstand
the next set of shocks or pressures. No political
price needs to be paid for quietly asking the right
questions and making the appropriate institutional
changes behind the scenes; an almost unthinkable
political price will be paid if these actions are not
taken soon and a future crisis occurs.
In addition to these five specific policy
recommendations, I suggest one more for the
Bank of Canada: it needs to place more emphasis
on the kinds of “political economy” arguments I
have examined here. Whether the Bank favours
the policy package outlined above or a different
set of improvements for the existing inflation-
targeting system, it should recognize the power of
political inertia and, thus, the need to pitch the
arguments for economic benefits against those of
political costs. The Bank needs to explain clearly
to the federal government the economic benefits
of any proposed change, including their scale and
distribution across different segments of the
population. The Bank also needs to consider how
the government might convince Canadians that
any proposed policy change is worthwhile. 
The details of monetary policy might be
fundamentally about economics, rather than
politics, but to proceed as if sensible economic
arguments will automatically carry the day is a
sure route to having proposals rejected. Good
economics can be the basis of good politics and
good policy, but only if the economic case is
clearly communicated in a manner appreciated by
both the people and their elected representatives. 
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